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ABSTRACT 
  We characterize the incentive compatible allocation that maximizes the 
expected social surplus in a single-unit sale when the efficient allocation is not 
implementable. This allocation may involve no selling when it is efficient to sell. We 
then show that the English auction always implements the second best allocation 
when there are only two bidders, but not with more than two. Our model employs a 
unidimensional type space with independent types and allocative externalities, but 
captures some features of models with multidimensional types. 
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 1 Introduction
In this paper we study mechanisms that maximize the expected social surplus gener-
ated by the sale of an indivisible unit subject to the buyers' incentive compatibility
constraints. This has been a fundamental question in the auction literature since
Vickrey (1961)'s seminal paper.
Previous papers that have addressed this question, e.g. Maskin (1992), Maskin
(2000), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), have focused on
conditions that guarantee that the incentive compatibility constraints are not binding.
For instance, when buyers have interdependent values, unidimensional type spaces,
independent types and we consider Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints, Das-
gupta and Maskin (2000) has shown that the condition takes the form of a particular
single crossing condition.1 This condition basically says that if it is ecient to allocate
the good to one buyer for a given prole of types, it must also be ecient to allocate
the good to this buyer when we increase her type keeping constant the types of the
other buyers.2
We analyze a variation of this framework but depart from the existing auction
literature and study eciency when the incentive compatibility constraints are binding.
Under our assumptions, this happens when the single crossing condition does not hold.
Maskin (2000) gives a realistic example in which the single crossing condition may
fail. Suppose the sale of the right to drill for oil between two wildcatters. The rst
one has a high marginal cost and a low xed cost, whereas the second one has a low
marginal cost and a high xed cost. In this case, it is ecient to allocate the good to
the rst wildcatter if there is little oil and to the second one if there is much oil. Thus,
the single crossing condition will fail if the amount of oil is exclusive information of
the rst wildcatter and this is the only source of asymmetric information.
We argue in the paper that the single crossing condition fails with some generality
in auction models with a (potentially) inecient incumbent and some xed costs as
1Krishna and Perry (1998) and Williams (1999) also characterize conditions for ecient Bayesian
implementation with independent types.
2Assuming that types are ordered so that the value function of a bidder is increasing in her type.
2suggested by the example in Maskin (2000). We also consider other applications of
economic interest: in particular, models in which the underlying private information
refers to common and private values or to allocative externalities. We illustrate these
two cases using an insider model and a model of entry in markets. The proper frame-
work for the general analysis of these cases is a multidimensional private uncertainty
model that we study in the Appendix.
We provide two types of results. First, we characterize the second best allocation
when the single crossing condition fails. This allocation may imply that the seller keeps
the object even when all bidders always value the object more than the seller ex post.
Our characterization is not complete in this last case.
Second, we analyze whether the second best can be implemented as the equilibrium
of an English auction. We start noting a negative result when the second best allocation
implies no selling, even if we allow for reserve prices or entry fees. Thus, we restrict to
the case in which the good is always sold in the second best. In this case, our results
are mixed and depend on the number of bidders.
The results are positive when there are only two bidders. The English auction pos-
sesses an equilibrium that implements the second best. We also discuss multiplicity
of equilibria and robustness, and nd that for a class of examples motivated by eco-
nomic applications, any equilibrium in non-weakly dominated strategies of the English
auction implements the second best.
However, the results are partially negative when there are more than two bidders.
The English auction does not always have an equilibrium (in non-weakly dominated
strategies) that implements the second best. In fact, we show that there is no such
equilibrium for the particular class of examples referred above. The reason is that in
equilibrium there are \rushes" with positive probability and standard rationing rules
do not ensure eciency in case of a tie.
Note that when the single crossing is violated the strategic decision of whether to
remain active at a certain price p is potentially more complex than otherwise. To see
why consider the wildcatter example when the rst wildcatter knows the amount of
oil. Recall that in this example the value of the rst wildcatter is higher than the value
3of the second wildcatter when there is little oil, i.e. when values are low, while the
reverse holds true if there is much oil, i.e. when values are high. Notice also that (as
in a private value auction) the rst wildcatter has a weakly dominant strategy: to stay
active until her value is reached. Thus, the price that the second wildcatter pays when
winning equals the rst wildcatter's valuation. This means that winning at low prices
implies a loss and winning at high prices a prot. Hence, the equilibrium strategy of
the second wildcatter must trade o such expected prots and losses.
More generally, when the single crossing condition fails, a bidder may nd it prof-
itable to stay active at prices at which she makes a loss when she wins because she
anticipates that the expected prots of winning at higher prices more than outweighs
such potential losses. But this means that bidders may regret winning ex-post in equi-
librium, i.e. there may be ex-post regret. It is precisely this feature that explains why
there may be \rushes" with more than two bidders.
The assumption that types are independent, albeit restrictive, is reasonable for
many interesting examples with common values, see our discussion in Section 2. Note
that when we relax this assumption, the results of Cremer and McLean (1985) im-
ply that the ecient allocation can be Bayesian implemented generically.3 But, the
mechanism requires arbitrarily large payments that seem unrealistic. More recently,
McLean and Postlewaite (2004) have shown that this critic does not apply when agents
are \informationally small". However, we expect agents to be \informationally small"
in general only when they are suciently many.
From a dierent perspective, Mezzetti (2004) has shown that Bayesian implemen-
tation of the ecient outcome can always be achieved in a two-stage mechanism if
the mechanism can condition on the realized outcome-payos. However, as Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2003) have already pointed out Mezzetti's mechanism displays no incen-
tives to reveal truthfully in the second stage, and requires that payments are made
when all information is available, which makes it sensitive to renegotiation and moral
hazard.
3Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) also cast some doubts on the genericity of these
results.
4Some of the above papers, in particular Maskin (1992), Maskin (2000), Dasgupta
and Maskin (2000), and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), have also studied the set of im-
plementable allocations when bidders have multidimensional private information. They
show that an implementable allocation cannot depend on the type beyond a particular
one-dimensional reduction. In general, the ecient allocation does not correspond to
this one-dimensional reduction and thus it is not implementable. They, however, note
that we can always dene a constrained ecient allocation that maximizes expected
social surplus subject to the one-dimensional reduction.
Although we assume for our main results a one-dimensional type space, we note
in Appendix B that our results may be useful in the eciency analysis based on the
one-dimensional reduced types. The reason is that there are no a priori arguments
that ensure that the one-dimensional reduction satises the single crossing condition
and thus the constrained ecient allocation may not be implementable.
Another related branch of the literature, in particular Maskin (1992), Krishna
(2003), Birulin and Izmalkov (2003), Dubra, Echenique, and Manelli (2008), and Iz-
malkov (2003), analyzes whether there is an equilibrium of the English auction that
allocates the good eciently when the ecient allocation is implementable. This lit-
erature shows that the answer, as in our model, depends on the number of bidders. If
there are only two bidders, there is always an ecient equilibrium, whereas with more
than two bidders this is not always the case and stronger conditions are required.
However, the reason that leads to this result in the rst best analysis in unrelated
to ours. In fact, under the assumptions of our paper (and with no externalities) the
English auction has an equilibrium that implements the rst best ecient allocation
(whenever it is implementable) independently of the number of bidders. We comple-
ment our results showing with some examples that under the presence of externalities
(and when there are more than two bidders) the English auction may fail to deliver
the ecient allocation even when it is feasible.
On the technical side, our work is related to Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Myerson
(1981). Basically, they analyze the allocation that maximizes the expected prots using
a technique called ironing. We use this technique to characterize the allocation that
5maximizes the expected social surplus. In a recent paper, Boone and Goeree (2008)
have used a simplied version of the ironing technique in an environment closely related
to our motivating example in Section 4.2. Their focus, as in Myerson (1981), is on
the revenue maximizing auction rather than on the maximum expected social surplus.
One of their ndings is that a qualifying auction is revenue maximizing. Finally, we
show in the paper that the ironing technique is not sucient to characterize second
best eciency when the second best ecient allocation requires no selling ex post.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We dene the formal set-up in Section
2. In Section 3 we study the implementation of the rst best allocation. Section 4
includes some motivating examples in which the rst best is not implementable. The
second best ecient allocation is characterized in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the
implementability of the second best through an English Auction and Section 7 con-
cludes. We include two appendixes: Appendix A with the most technical proofs and
Appendix B with an extension of our model to multidimensional types. Some argu-
ments that are omitted or not fully carried over in the main appendixes are included
in the supplementary material that ends the paper.
2 The Model
One unit of an indivisible good is put up for sale to a set N  f1;2;:::;ng of n
bidders. Let s = (s1;:::;sn) 2 Rn be a vector where si corresponds to the realization of
an independent random variable with distribution Fi with a strictly positive density4
in a bounded support Si  R. Bidder i 2 N observes privately si and gets a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility vi(s)   p if she gets the good for sale at price p, and
utility  ej(sj)   p if Bidder j, j 6= i, gets the good and i pays a price p. Thus, ej
denotes a negative externality5 produced by j on each of the other bidders. To make
the analysis simpler, we assume that the seller neither derives utility from getting the
good nor suers any externality. We also assume that it is ecient to allocate to one
4Monteiro and Svaiter (2007) and Skreta (2007) have recently shown how to extend Myerson's
(1981) analysis to distribution functions without density.
5Note that we also allow for ej(sj) < 0 and thus for positive externalities.
6of the bidders, i.e. that maxi fvi(s)   (n   1)ei(si)g  0 for any s.
We assume additive separability of the bidders' value functions plus a symmetry
assumption on the common value component. Formally,6 vi(s) = ti(si) +
P
i2N qj(sj)
for any i 2 N, where ti(si) (ti stands for taste) is the private value and
P
i2N qj(sj) (qj
stands for quality) is the common value. We also assume that ti, qi and ei are bounded,
that vi(s) is a strictly increasing function of si, i.e. that i(si)  ti(si)+qi(si) is strictly
increasing, and that hi(si)  ti(si) (n 1)ei(si) is measurable and at any point either
right or left continuous.
Our additive separability assumptions are restrictive. We can interpret them as
an approximation. The independency assumption may sound unrealistic for a model
with common values. Note, however, that this critic only applies when two or more
players have private information about the common value, whereas this is not the case
in our motivating examples, see Section 4. Moreover, there are other real life examples
in which the independency assumption is reasonable, see Bergemann and V alim aki
(2002).
3 First Best Eciency





i=1 pi(s)  1 for any s 2 S. We are interested in the set of allocations that can
be implemented. By the revelation principle, there is no loss of generality in restricting
to direct mechanisms. A direct mechanism is a pair of measurable functions (p;x) where
p is an allocation and x : S ! Rn a payment function. In the direct mechanism (p;x),
each bidder announces a type, and pi(s) denotes the probability that i gets the good
and xi(s) her transfers to the auctioneer when the vector of announced types is s 2 S.
The expected utility of Bidder i with type si who reports s0
i when all the other
6In the text, we usually give as primitives the vi's functions for simplicity. A simple way to
recover the ti's and qi's from the vi's when S = [0;1]
n is as follows: ti(si) = vi(0;:::;0;si;0;:::;0)  
vj(0;:::;0;si;0;:::;0) + vj(0), for a j 6= i, and qi(si) = vj(0;:::;0;si;0;:::;0)   vj(0). The functions ti
and qi deduced in this way correspond to the normalization that qi(0) = 0 for all i.
































j6=i Sj and f i(s i) 
Q
j6=i fj(sj).
Thus, we say that an allocation p : S ! [0;1]n is feasible if there exists a di-







for all si 2 Si and i 2 N.
The following lemma characterizes the feasible allocation using a standard argu-
ment in mechanism design, see for instance Myerson (1981), Rochet (1985) and McAfee
and McMillan (1988):
Lemma 1. An allocation p is feasible if and only if Qi(si;p) is weakly increasing in
si for all si 2 [0;1] and i 2 N.
See proof in the Appendix.
We use the following natural denition:
7With some abuse of notation, we denote by pi(si;s i) and pj(si;s i) the function pi and pj,
respectively, evaluated at a vector whose l-th component is equal to the l-th component of s i if l < i,
it is equal to si if l = i and it is equal to the l   1-th component of s i if l > i. We adopt the same
convention for xi(si;s i).
8We do not impose individual rationality constraints. They are trivially satised in our set-up. For
instance, note that the mechanism proposed in Lemma 1 veries that all bidders' types get non-negative
utility.
8Denition: We say that an allocation p is rst best ecient when pi(s) > 0 only if:




j=1 pj(s) = 1, for all s 2 S.
Simple algebraic transformations show that rst best eciency requires allocating
to the bidder with highest hi(si).
We adapt the following denition to our framework:9
Denition: We say that the single crossing condition is satised for bidder i if,
vi(s)   (n   1)ei(si) > maxfvj(s)   (n   1)ej(sj)gj6=i
implies that
vi(s0)   (n   1)ei(s0
i)  maxfvj(s0)   (n   1)ej(s0
j)gj6=i;
for any s;s0 2 S such that s0
i > si and sj = s0
j for j 6= i.
The interpretation of the single crossing condition is that if it is (rst best) ecient
to allocate to Bidder i for some signal prole, it cannot be the case that increasing
Bidder i's type (keeping the other types constant) makes it ecient to allocate to
Bidder j 6= i.
Our additive separability assumptions allow for a condition simpler to check in
applications.
9The single crossing condition usually corresponds to the following alternative condition:
vi(s)   (n   1)ei(si)  maxfvj(s)   (n   1)ej(sj)gj6=i
implies that
vi(s
0)   (n   1)ei(s
0
i) > maxfvj(s





i > si and s
0
j = sj for j 6= i.
This alternative condition is sucient for feasibility of the rst best. If we add dierentiability
(and our assumption of additive separability), it also implies the single crossing condition of Dasgupta
and Maskin (2000), the pairwise single crossing condition, the average crossing condition and the
cyclical crossing condition of Krishna (2003) and the generalized single crossing condition of Birulin
and Izmalkov (2003). We have used instead our denition to get also a necessary condition.
9Lemma 2. The single crossing condition for Bidder i is satised if and only if for any
si;s0
i 2 Si such that s0
i > si, the set,
fs i 2 S i : maxfhj(sj)gj6=i 2 (hi(s0
i);hi(si))g
is empty.
See proof in the Appendix.
Note that the condition in Lemma 2 basically says that hi(:) must be an increasing
function at any point at which its value may determine the rst best ecient allocation.
Proposition 1. A necessary and sucient condition for the rst best to be feasible is
that the single crossing condition is satised for all bidders.
See proof in the Appendix.
Intuitively, if the single crossing condition fails, the rst best allocation requires
that we move away the allocation of the object from Bidder i to some other bidder as we
increase Bidder i's type around a given vector of types. Under our additive separability
assumption, this implies that Bidder i's probability of winning conditional on her type
must decrease at some point violating the feasibility conditions in Proposition 1.
That a version of our single crossing condition is sucient for feasibility of the rst
best is well known. The necessary part is a consequence of the additive structure of our
model. Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) have also proved that a single crossing condition
is necessary for a more demanding denition of feasibility of the rst best.
4 Economic Applications
In this section, we provide some economic models in which the single crossing condition
will typically fail.
104.1 An Incumbent's Model
This model formalizes a version of the wildcatters' example mentioned in the Intro-
duction. Suppose the sale of a license to become a monopolist of a market with an
inverse demand function P(Q) = 1 
Q
s1. Suppose there is a set N of rms interested in
the license. Firm 1 2 N is an incumbent that has zero set-up costs to start to operate
the license and a constant marginal cost c1. The other rms are potential entrants.
They incur in a set-up cost to start operating the license. We denote by  si, i 6= 1 the
set-up cost of Firm i. We assume that all the entrants have the same marginal cost c.
We also assume that c < c1 < 1.
We assume that s1 is the realization of a random variable with a distribution
function F1 and a density in the support [s;s], 0 < s < s. We also assume that each
si, i 6= 1, is the realization of a random variable with a distribution function Fi and a
density in the support [ s
(1 c)2
4 ;0]. The lower bound of the support implies that an
entrant always nds it protable to buy the license at zero price, whereas the upper
bound ensures that there is an entrant type that values the license more than the
incumbent. Finally, we assume that all the above random variables are independent,
and that si is private information of Firm i.









+ si and ei(si) = 0 for i 6= 1:







, q1(s1) = s1
(1 c)2
4 , e1(s1) = 0, and
tj(sj) = hj(sj) = sj, qj(sj) = 0 and ej(sj) = 0, for j 6= 1.
To see why the single crossing condition is violated in this example, note that
h1(s) > h1(s), hj( s
(1 c)2
4 ) < h1(s) and hj(0) > h1(s), j 6= 1. Hence, by continuity
of hj there exists an sj 2 [ s
(1 c)2
4 ;0] such that hj(sj) 2 (h1(s);h1(s)). Thus, the
application of Lemma 2 for si = s and s0
i = s, and i = 1 means that the single crossing
condition fails for Bidder 1.
114.2 An Insider's Model
Suppose the sale of a painting to a set N of risk neutral bidders. The painting may
be an original painting of a well-known (and priced) artist. Bidder i puts a value on
the painting of i + if the painting is original and otherwise a value of i. We assume
that each i is equal to an independent drawn of a random variable with a distribution
function Gi and a density in the support [t;t]. We assume that i is private information
of Bidder i. One of the bidders, Bidder 1, is an expert art dealer and she is the only
one knowing whether the painting is original. The other bidders know only that the
ex ante probability that the picture is original is equal to  2 (0;1).
Under the assumption that  + t > t, it is easy to see that this model may be
written in terms of the notation of Section 2 as follows: v1(s) = s1, e1(s1) = 0,
vi(s) = si + 1[t+;t+](s1) and10 ei(si) = 0, i 6= 1, where s1 has a distribution
F1(s1) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
G1(s1) if s1 < t
 if s1 2 [t; + t)
 + (1   )G1(s1   ) otherwise,
with support [t;t] [ [t + ;t + ] and si, i 6= 1, is distributed according to Gi(:). Note
that according to this convention, s1 2 [t + ;t + ] indicates that the painting is
original.
In this application we have that t1(s1) = h1(s1) = s1   1[t+;t+](s1), q1(s1) =
1[t+;t+](si), ti(si) = hi(si) = si and qi(si) = 0 for i 6= 1, and it is easy to verify that
the single crossing condition is violated for Bidder 1. To see why, apply Lemma 2 to
s1 = t    and s0
1 = t +  +  for  > 0 and small enough.
The analysis of the case  + t  t is done in Appendix B. Such case motivates
the extension that covers a special class of games with multidimensional information
carried over in that Appendix.
101X(x) is an indicator function that takes value 1 when x 2 X and otherwise takes value 0.
124.3 A Model with Negative Externalities
Suppose n local markets, each with a unit mass of consumers with reservation value
1 for the consumption of the good. Suppose also a set N of n rms. Each rm starts
with a branch in a local market. Initially, no two rms have a branch at the same
local market. Firms can open new branches at a xed cost C < 1 and serve any local
market in which they have a branch at a marginal cost c.
Suppose that a seller puts up for sale a technology that reduces the marginal costs
of rm i by an amount si. Suppose that si is drawn from an independent distribution
Fi with support [0;c]. If only one rm serves a market, its prots are equal to 1   c.
When more than one rm serves a local market, we assume an outcome consistent with
Bertrand competition: the rm with the lowest marginal cost serves the market at a
price equal to the second lowest marginal cost. In case of more than one rm with the
lowest marginal cost, we assume that they split equally the demand at a price equal
to their common marginal cost. Thus, a rm nds it protable to open a branch in
each of the other markets only if she has won the technology and the reduction in the
marginal cost is suciently large, in particular, if and only if si > C.
We can write this model in terms of the notation of Section 2 as follows: vi(s) =
ti(si) = si, and ei(si) = 0 if si  C, and vi(s) = ti(si) = si + (n   1)(si   C) and
ei(si) = 1   c, otherwise, and qi(si) = 0. As consequence, hi(si) = si for si  C and
hi(si) = si (n 1)(C+1 c si), otherwise. In this case, the single crossing condition
is violated for any bidder. To see why, apply Lemma 2 to si = C    and si = C + ,
and sj 2 (C   ;C) for all j 6= i, and  > 0 and small enough.
5 Second Best Eciency
In light of Proposition 1, it is natural to dene second best eciency.





(vi(s)   (n   1)ei(si))pi(s)f(s)ds;
subject to p feasible and for f(s) 
Q
i2N fi(si).
13Certainly, the set of second best allocations includes the rst best allocation when
the single crossing condition is satised.
It also turns out to be useful to dene the following concept.
Denition: We say that an allocation p is second best ecient subject to always selling




(vi(s)   (n   1)ei(si))pi(s)f(s)ds;
subject to p feasible and
Pn
i=1 pi(s) = 1 for any s 2 S.






subject to p feasible and
Pn
i=1 pi(s) = 1 for any s 2 S.
To simplify the notation in what follows, we shall assume without loss of generality
that each Fi is uniform on [0;1].11 To see why this assumption is without loss of
generality suppose that the Fi's were not uniform. Then, we could dene a new vector
of signals ~ si  Fi(si) and value functions ~ vi(~ s)  ~ ti(~ si) +
P
i2N ~ qj(~ sj) and ~ ej(~ sj)
where12 ~ ti(~ si)  ti(F 1
i (~ si)), ~ qj(~ sj)  qj(F 1
j (~ sj)) and ~ ej(~ sj)  ej(F 1
j (~ sj)), where
note that each of the new signals ~ si's has a uniform distribution on [0;1].13
Recall that it is rst best ecient to allocate according to hi(si). However, this
allocation is not implementable when hi is not increasing. We next show how to derive
from the hi functions some functions gi that are increasing and that determine the
second best allocation like the hi's determine the rst best.
Let Hi(si) 
R si
0 hi(~ si)d~ si for all i 2 n and si 2 [0;1], and let Gi(si) : [0;1] ! R be
the convex hull of the function Hi (i.e. the highest convex function on [0;1] such that
11Lehmann (1988) already showed that there is no loss of generality in assuming that signals have
a uniform marginal distribution.
12As a convention, we denote by F
 1(z)  minfsi 2 [s;s] : F(s)  zg.
13To see why, note that the probability of f~ si  zg for z 2 [0;1] is equal to the probability of
fFi(si)  zg, which is equal to the probability of fsi  F
 1
i (z)g and thus, it is equal to Fi(F
 1
i (z)) = z.
14Gi(si)  Hi(si) for all si 2 [0;1].) Formally:14
Gi(si) = minfwHi(r1) + (1   w)Hi(r2) : w;r1;r2 2 [0;1] and wr1 + (1   w)r2 = sig:
Lemma 3. Properties of Gi:
(a) Gi is convex.
(b) Gi(0) = Hi(0) and Gi(1) = Hi(1).
(c) Gi(si)  Hi(si) for all si 2 [0;1].
(d) If Gi(si) < Hi(si) in an open interval, then Gi is linear in the same open interval.
Proof. All the properties in the proposition follow from the application to the denition
of convex hull of standard mathematical arguments that we do not reproduce. 
As a convex function Gi is dierentiable except at countably many points, and its
derivative is a non-decreasing function. We dene gi : [0;1] ! R to be the dierential
of Gi completed by right-continuity.
Note that when hi is an increasing function then gi = hi, but this is not the case
when hi is decreasing in some interval. Suppose, for instance, that hi(si) =    si.
Then Hi(si) = si   s2
i=2, and since it is concave, its convex hull is simply a straight
line connecting (0;Hi(0)) and (1;Hi(1)), i.e. Gi(si) = (  1
2)s1. Thus, gi(si) = (  1
2).
Note that in this case gi is in fact the average value of hi in [0;1].
More generally, the function gi is equal to hi except in some intervals around the
points at which hi is not increasing. In these intervals, gi takes the average value of
hi in the interval, i.e. the hi function is \ironed out" in these intervals. The following
example illustrates this point: hi(si) = 2si if si < 1=2, and hi(si) = 2si   1 otherwise.
It can be shown after some algebra that gi(si) = hi(si) = 2si if si < 1=4, gi(si) = 1=2
(i.e. the average value of hi in [1=4;3=4)) if [1=4;3=4) and gi(si) = hi(si) = 2si   1 if
si  3=4, see Figure 1.15
14See also Rockafellar (1970), Pag. 36.
15Mussa and Rosen (1978), pp. 313-314, provide a similar illustration for the case of a price dis-
criminating monopolist that faces a non-monotonic marginal revenue.








Figure 1: Ironing: the functions hi and gi (dashed) when hi is not increasing.
The next proposition shows that it is second best ecient (subject to always selling)
to allocate according to the gi's plus an additional condition.
Proposition 2. A feasible allocation p is second best ecient subject to always selling
if and only if
Pn
i=1 p




















i(s) = 1 maximizes the above expression when 8i 2 N:
(i) p
i(s) > 0 only if gi(si) = maxfgj(sj)gj2N a.e.
(ii) Qi(:;p) is constant in any open interval in which Gi(si) < Hi(si).
See proof in the Appendix.
Note that within the set of allocations that always sells, an allocation that veries
condition (i) maximizes the rst integral in Equation (1), and if it veries condition
16We denote by
R
E '(x)dF(x) the Lebesgue-Stieljes integral of ' with respect to F in E. In partic-
ular, for any feasible allocation p, we denote by
R
Si '(si)dQi(si;p) the Lebesgue-Stieljes integral of '
with respect to Qi(:;p) in Si.
16(ii), it also maximizes the second integral. To see the latter, recall that by Lemma
3(c), the second integral is non-positive, whereas condition (ii) implies that it is zero.
We next illustrate the proposition with an example with two bidders. To make it
simpler, in our example only Bidder 1 has private information, or equivalently, v1(s)
and v2(s) are constant with respect to s2. Although this departs from our general
assumptions, the only dierence is that the incentive compatibility constraints for
Bidder 2 are trivially satised and thus the conditions of Lemma 1 only need to hold
for Bidder 1.
Example 1. N = f1;2g, v1(s) =  + s1, v2(s) = 
 + 2s1 and ei(si) = 0 for all i,
where ;
  0 and  + 
 2 (0;1) .
Note that h1(s1) =    s1 and h2(s2) = 
, and hence the rst best allocation is
to give the good to Bidder 1 if    s1 > 
 and otherwise to Bidder 2. This is not
feasible since it implies that the probability that Bidder 1 gets the good is decreasing
in her type and thus the feasibility condition of Lemma 1 is not met. Note then that
g1(s1) =    1=2, and g2(s2) = 
. Thus, by application of Proposition 2, the second
best is to allocate to Bidder 1 if  1=2 > 
 and to allocate to Bidder 2 if  1=2 < 
.17
To understand why this allocation is second best ecient (subject to always selling)
note that there are only two candidate allocations: to allocate the good to Bidder 1
for any s1, or to allocate the good to Bidder 2 for any s1. To see why, note that the
greater s1 is, the less desirable from an ecient point of view is to allocate to Bidder 1,
whereas the feasibility condition requires that if we allocate to Bidder 1 for some type
s1 we must allocate to Bidder 1 also for higher types. Between these two candidates,
the former is second best if Bidder 1 has greater value than Bidder 2 on average, i.e
if    1=2 > 
, whereas the latter is second best otherwise. This is precisely what
Proposition 2 says.
Next proposition gives sucient conditions under which it is second best to always
sell. This condition basically ensures that the set of allocations that maximizes the
rst integral in Equation (1) implies always selling.
17Note that in the case    1=2 = 
 the second best only requires that Q1(s1;p
) is constant in s1
in the open interval (0;1).
17Proposition 3. If maxi2N gi(si) +
Pn
j=1 qj(s)  0, then any second best ecient
allocation subject to always selling is also second best ecient.
See proof in the Appendix.
To interpret the condition in the proposition recall that the social surplus of al-
locating to i is equal to vi(s)   (n   1)ei(si) = hi(si) +
Pn
j=1 qj(s) and that gi is a
version of hi in which the non-monotone parts of hi are iron-out by taking mean val-
ues. Note that this means that when hi is weakly increasing for one bidder and the
social value of allocating the good to this bidder is greater than the seller's value, i.e.
vi(s)   (n   1)ei(si)  0, 8si, the condition in Proposition 3 is veried. This is the
case in the examples of Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
When the condition maxi2N gi(si) +
Pn
j=1 qj(sj)  0 does not hold, the second
best may imply some interesting results. Consider the following example:
Example 2. N = f1;2g, vi(s) = si + 2sj and ei(si) = 0 for i;j 2 f1;2g and i 6= j.
In this example, hi(si) =  si, Hi(si) =  
s2
i
2 , and thus, Gi(si) =  si
2 and gi(si) =
 1


























Thus, maximizing the rst integral requires that a.e. p1(s)+p2(s) = 0 for s1+s2 
1=4 and p1(s)+p2(s) = 1 otherwise, and maximizing the second integral requires that
Qi(:;p) is constant in (0;1) for i = 1;2. The allocation described in Figure 2 satises
both conditions18 and it is therefore second best ecient.
In the above example it is (rst best) ecient to allocate the good to Bidder 2
when her signal is low and Bidder 1's signal is high. Similarly, it is ecient to allocate
the good to Bidder 1 when her signal is low and Bidder 2's signal is high. However,
this allocation is dicult to implement because both bidders have very little incentives
to report truthfully when their signal is high. In fact, this problem is so severe that
when we restrict to always selling we cannot do better than ignoring bidders' signals
18Note that for this allocation Q1(s1;p) = Q2(s2;p) =
31





































Figure 2: Second best allocation (p1(s);p2(s)) for Example 2
and allocate the object with equal probability between the bidders. This may be easily
shown applying Proposition 2.
The random allocation described in the paragraph above diers from the allocation
in Figure 2 in that the latter allocation does not allocate the good to any bidder in
the triangle in the lower-left corner and that it allocates more often to Bidder 2 in
the rectangle in the lower-right corner and more often to Bidder 1 in the rectangle in
the upper-left corner. The reason why this improves expected surplus is because the
eciency loss of not allocating the good to any bidder in the triangle is small, both
values are close to zero, whereas the allocation in the rectangles is closer to the rst
best.
19Note that the second best ecient allocation cannot be always characterized by
maximizing both integrals in Equation (1) simultaneously. In fact, the following slight
modication of Example 2 illustrates this point:19 v1(s1;s2) = s1 + 2s2 +  and
v2(s1;s2) = s2 + 2s1 with  > 0 and small. It may be shown that the maximiza-
tion of the rst integral of the corresponding Equation (1) requires that p satises a.e.
that p(s) = (0;0) if s1 + s2 < 1
4   
2, and p(s) = (1;0), otherwise. Any such allocation
veries that Q1(s1;p) is strictly increasing in s1 for s1 2 [0; 1
4   
2]. However, the
maximization of the second integral of the corresponding Equation (1) requires that p
veries that Q1(s1;p) is constant in s1 in the open interval (0;1).
Finally, we show with an example that maxi2N gi(si) +
Pn
j=1 qj(sj) < 0 does not
imply that the second best requires no selling:20
Example 3. N = f1;2g, v1(s) = 1=4 and v2(s) = s1   1, and ei(si) = 0 for all i.
In this example, h1(s1) = 1=4   s1, q1(s1) = s1, g1(s1) =  1=4, h2(s2) = g2(s2) =
 1 and q2(s2) = 0. Thus, maxi2N gi(si) +
Pn
j=1 qj(sj) = s1   1=4, which is negative
for s1 < 1=4. However, it is ecient to always allocate to Bidder 1.
6 English Auction
In this section we analyze whether the second best can be implemented with an English
auction. In particular, we assume the model of the English auction described by
Krishna (2003). This auction model is a variation of the Japanese auction proposed
by Milgrom and Weber (1982) in which the identity of the bidders is observable.
We introduce two additional assumptions. The rst one is a simplication, we
assume that the functions hi's are continuous. This assumption implies:
Lemma 4. The functions gi's are continuous. Moreover:
19We have chosen an asymmetric counter-example because it makes the argument more transparent.
However, we could also provide a symmetric counter-example. It is easy to verify that the following
one does work: N = f1;2g, vi(s) = 20 1[:9;1](sj)+(si +sj)+1[1=2;1](si)+1[1=2;1](sj) and ei(si) = 0.
20To make the example more transparent, we have violated one of our assumptions, namely that
1(s1) is strictly increasing. Note, however, that this can be easily xed changing v1 to 1=4 + s1 and
v2 to s1   1 + s2. For  suciently small, this change generates the appropriate counterexample.
20(a) gi(si) = hi(si) if Gi(si) = Hi(si) and si 2 (0;1).
(b) gi(0)  hi(0) with strict inequality only if Gi() < Hi() for any  > 0 small
enough.
(c) gi(1)  hi(1) with strict inequality only if Gi(1   ) < Hi(1   ) for any  > 0
small enough.
See proof in the Appendix.
The second assumption is that i(si)  qi(si) + ei(si) is non-decreasing. This
assumption ensures that our proposed bid functions are increasing. It translates to
our set-up a similar assumption used in the study of rst best eciency in English
auctions, see Maskin (2000), Krishna (2003) and Birulin and Izmalkov (2003) that
requires the bidders' values to be non-decreasing functions of the bidders' types.
We start remarking that in general there is very little hope that the English auction
can implement the second best when it implies no selling. To see why, recall that in
Example 1, second best requires no selling if s1 + s2  1=4. However, an English
auction with an entry fee and/or a reserve price can only ensure no selling for sets of
types f(s1;s2) 2 [0;1]2 : s1  s1;s2  s2g for some si 2 [0;1].
In what follows to save space we refer to the second best allocation subject to
always selling simply as the second best. We shall show that whether the English
auction implements that allocation depends on the number of bidders. We start with
the two bidder's case.
6.1 An English Auction with Only Two Bidders
Suppose in this subsection that n = 2. We shall show that in this case, the English
auction implements the second best ecient allocation. We start with an example:
Example 4. N = f1;2g, v1(s) = s1 + 1, v2(s) = s2 + 2s1 and ei(si) = 0 for all i.
In this example, h1(s1) = 1 s1, g1(s1) = 1=2 and h2(s2) = g2(s2) = s2. Thus, the
single crossing condition is not satised and it is second best to allocate to Bidder 1 if
21g2(s2)  g(s1), i.e. s2  1=2, and otherwise to allocate to Bidder 2.
Note that Bidder 1 has a unique weakly dominant strategy, to bid until s1 + 1.
The argument is the same as in private value auctions: bidding less means losing at
prices below the value, and bidding higher means winning at prices greater than the
value. If Bidder 1 with type s1 bids p  s1 +1 and Bidder 2 wins, Bidder 2 with type
s2 gets prots s2 + 2s1   p, which are equal to h2(s2)   h1(s1) = h2(s2)   h1(p   1).
Thus, since h1 is decreasing, the greater the price, the more protable it is for Bidder
2 to win the auction. As a consequence, Bidder 2's best response is either to submit
a bid that always loses, e.g. p = 1, or a bid that always wins, e.g. p = 2. The
former option is optimal if h2(s2) is less than the average value of h1 in [0;1], i.e. if
g2(s2)  g1(s1) = 1=2, and the latter otherwise.
Consequently, Bidder 2 wins the auction if and only if g2(s2)  g1(s1) in any
equilibrium in which Bidder 1 uses her unique weakly dominant strategy, and hence the
resulting allocation is second best ecient. Note that the structure of this equilibrium
is more involved than in the more standard model in which the single crossing condition
is satised. The dierence is that Bidder 2 may be active at prices at which she makes
a loss if she wins, i.e. there may be ex-post regret. The reason why this is protable
for Bidder 2 is that winning at higher prices is suciently protable to oset the losses
at lower prices.
The following lemma generalizes this example. Note that this lemma analyzes the
case in which one bidder has no uncertainty with respect to her willingness to pay for
the object, and it includes, as particular cases, the insider and the incumbent's models
of Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
Lemma 5. If q2(s2) = e2(s2) = 0 for any s2 2 [0;1], then any equilibrium of the
English auction in non-weakly dominated strategies implements the second best.
See proof in the Appendix.
Next, we show how this result extends to the general case. As we shall see, there
always exists an equilibrium that implements the second best ecient allocation but
in some cases there may be other equilibria that are not second best ecient.
22We follow three steps. First, we propose a bid function for each bidder; second, we
prove that the good is allocated according to the second best allocation when bidders
use the proposed bid functions; and nally, we show that the proposed bid functions
are an equilibrium of the English auction. Next, we discuss uniqueness.









i(sj) are equal to the minimum and maximum si, respectively, that





equal to zero if gj(sj) < gi(0) and equal to one if gj(sj) > gi(1). Note that Lemma 3

















ej(sj) (this is ve
i(si;sj) = i(si) + j(sj)). Thus, we propose that Bidder 1 (respec-
tively Bidder 2) bids her maximum willingness to pay to obtain the object when the
alternative is that the good goes to the other bidder conditional on the hypothetical
event that the signal of the other bidder is equal to s1
2(s1) (respectively s2
1(s2).) To





2(s2) if and only if g1(s1)  g2(s2).
 b
1(s1) < b
2(s2) if and only if g1(s1) < g2(s2).
See proof in the Appendix.
The lemma is easy to understand for the "standard" case in which the single cross-
ing condition holds. In this case the hi's are typically strictly increasing. Then,
g1(s1) = g2(s2) is equivalent to h1(s1) = h2(s2), s1
2(s1) = s2, and s2
1(s2) = s1, and
these three conditions are equivalent to b
1(s1) = b
2(s2). Thus, the monotonicity of the
bid functions imply the lemma. As a matter of fact, the same argument holds true lo-
cally whenever h1(s1) = g1(s1) = h2(s2) = g2(s2) and g1 and g2 are strictly increasing
23locally. However, the proof of the lemma requires a more elaborated analysis at points
in which hi(si) 6= gi(si).
One implication of the previous lemma is that b
2(s2) 2 (b
1(s1   );b
1(s1 + )] for
 > 0 is equivalent to s2 2 (s1
2(s1   );s1




1(s1) is equivalent to s2 = s1
2(s1), and hence, our proposed bid function
b
1 is such that Bidder 1 bids the expected value of the good conditional on tying with
Bidder 2. The interpretation of Bidder 2's bid function is similar.
Corollary 1. The allocation induced by (b
1;b
2) is second best ecient.
See proof in the Appendix.
Finally, next proposition shows that the proposed bid functions are in fact an
equilibrium:
Proposition 4. The bid functions (b
1;b
2) form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
English auction.
See proof in the Appendix.
We can thus conclude from Corollary 1 and Proposition 4,
Corollary 2. The English auction has an equilibrium that implements the second best
when there are two bidders.
The reader may worry that the above bid functions are identity dependent. We
shall argue that in general this is not a problem. First, let Ki  fk 2 R : 9(s;s) 6=
;;gi(si) = k;8si 2 (s;s)g and note the following lemma:
Lemma 7. If K1 \ K2 = ;, then si
j(si) = si
j(si) almost everywhere.
See proof in the Appendix.
Thus, this lemma together with the fact that asymmetries only arise when si
j(si) 6=
si
j(si) imply that when K1\K2 = ; asymmetries only occur in a set of types with zero
21Note that b

1 is continuous almost everywhere because it is increasing.
24measure, and thus, could be removed without upsetting the equilibrium. Moreover,
we expect K1 \ K2 = ; to hold generically since the sets Ki's are countable.22
Nevertheless, the issue of asymmetries remains when bidders are symmetric, i.e.
when 1 = 2, and 1 = 2. In this case, K1 \ K2 6= ;, and in fact, the symmetric
equilibrium is not second best ecient if the single crossing conditions does not hold.
To see why, recall Example 2 and note that the only symmetric equilibrium is b(si) =
3si, i = 1;2. This equilibrium allocates the good to the bidder with higher type which
is not second best ecient. Instead, our proposed strategies are b
1(s1) = s1 + 2 and
b
2(s2) = s2.
Indeed, the English auction has more problems of multiplicity of equilibria when
the single crossing condition fails than when it holds, even when K1 \ K2 = ;. The
following example provides an illustration of this point.
Example 5. N = f1;2g, v1(s1;s2) = s1 + 3
2s2 and v2(s1;s2) = s2 +2s1, and e1(s1) =
e2(s2) = 0.
In this example h1(s1) =  s1 and h2(s2) =  1
2s2. Thus, g1(s1) =  1
2 and
g2(s2) =  1
4, and consequently, the second best allocation is to give the good to Bidder
2 for any realization of the bidders' types. This is the allocation that is implemented by
our proposed equilibrium applied to this example: b
1(s1) = s1, b
2(s2) = s2 + 2. How-
ever, there exist other equilibria that do not implement the second best, for instance,23
b1(s1) = s1 + 3
2, b2(s2) = s2. Note that both this equilibrium and our proposed equi-
librium (b
1;b
2) survive iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, whereas
recall that Chung and Ely (2001) have shown that when the single crossing condi-
22A simple argument is as follows. Let g
 1
i (k)  minfsi 2 [0;1] : gi(si) = kg. It is easy to see
that if gi is constant and equal to k in an open interval, then the function g
 1
i is discontinuous at k
by denition. Finally, note that the set of the discontinuities of g
 1




23Bidder 1 does not have incentives to deviate because she wins with probability one at a price less
than her value, whereas Bidder 2 does not have incentives to deviate because any bid p 2 [b1(0);b1(1)],









ds1  0 for any s2 2 [0;1]. Moreover,
Bidder 2 does not have incentives to bid above b1(1) because those bids give the same expected payos
as a bid b1(1).
25tion holds there is a unique equilibrium in the English auction with two bidders that
survives to iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
6.2 An English Auction with More than Two Bidders
In this section, we study the case in which there are more than two bidders, i.e. n > 2.
We shall see that the English auction does not always implement the second best. We
start with an example. In this example and in the rest of the section, it is important
that we describe the tie-breaking rule. We shall assume the good is allocated with equal
probability among the bidders that tie.24 We conjecture that any other tie-breaking
rule that does not condition on the bidders' types would imply similar results.
Example 6. N = f1;2;3g, v1(s) = s1 + 1
2, v2(s) = s2 + 2s1, v3(s) = s3 + 2s1 and
ei(si) = 0 for all i.
In this example, h1(s1) = 1
2   s1, g1(s1) = 0, and hi(si) = gi(si) = si, i 2 f2;3g.
Hence, it is second best ecient to allocate to Bidder 2 if s2 > s3 and to Bidder
3, otherwise. Note that, as in Example 4, Bidder 1 has a unique weakly dominant
strategy: to remain in the auction until the price reaches her value s1 + 1
2. We show
in the next lemma that there is no equilibrium of the English auction that implements
the second best ecient allocation when Bidder 1 uses her unique weakly dominant
strategy.
Lemma 8. In Example 6, there is no equilibrium of the English auction in non-weakly
dominated25 strategies that implements the second best ecient allocation.
24In our auction, the price increases continuously until one bidder or more quit. Then, the price is
stopped and the following algorithm is repeated: (1) If there are no more active bidders, the good is
allocated with equal probability among the bidders that last quitted at the current price. Otherwise,
(2) the identity of the bidders that still remain active is announced. (3) After the announcement,
bidders that still remain active declare independently and simultaneously whether they quit. If no
bidder quits, the price starts again to increase from the current level. If some bidder quits, we go to
(1) again.
25Actually, in this lemma and in Lemma 9 we only need that Bidder 1 uses her weakly dominant
strategy.
26Proof. To simplify, we refer in the proof to an equilibrium in non-weakly dominated
strategies as an equilibrium. We shall prove the lemma in two steps. First, we show by
contradiction that in any equilibrium that implements the second best, the strategies
of both Bidder 2 and Bidder 3 must specify that they quit at a price less than Bidder
1's minimum bid, i.e. 1
2, in information sets in which no bidder has quit yet for types
less than 1=2. Second, we argue that if such is the case Bidder 3 has a protable
deviation.
Suppose Bidder 1 quits at a price p > 1
2, and both Bidder 2 and 3 are still active
and have types s2 and s3 less than 1=2. Then Bidder 2 and 3 put a value in getting the
good equal to s2 +2(p 1=2) and s3 +2(p 1=2), respectively, which are less than the
price p. Hence, they both quit immediately after Bidder 1 and tie. Our tie breaking
rule implies that the induced allocation cannot be second best ecient.
Suppose now that Bidder 2 quits at a price p  1
2 when she has a type s2 in
information sets in which no bidder has quit yet. Then, second best eciency implies
that Bidders 3 with a type s3 in (0;s2) also quits at a price strictly less than p in
the same information sets. In this case, Bidder 3 has a protable deviation. In this
deviation Bidder 3 remains in the auction until either the price reaches 1
2 or Bidder 2
quits. In the former case, Bidder 3 quits, and in the latter, Bidder 3 remains active
until Bidder 1 quits. This deviation lets Bidder 3 win additionally when Bidder 2 has
















)ds1 = s3 > 0:

Intuitively, if Bidders 2 and 3 have a low type and are still active when Bidder
1 quits at a price close to 1=2 a \rush" occurs since both bidders nd out that their
values are less than the price. Thus, the need to select the most ecient bidder between
Bidder 2 and Bidder 3 before a rush may occur bounds Bidders 2 and Bidder 3 drop
out prices to a level that is incompatible with their private incentives. Hence the
impossibility.
27The above result generalizes when Bidder 1 has no uncertainty about the value she
puts in winning and under no externalities as follows:
Lemma 9. Suppose n > 2 and ei(si) = qi(si) = 0 for i 6= 1 and si 2 [0;1]. There is no
equilibrium in non-weakly dominated strategies of the English auction that implements
the second best ecient allocation, if:
g1(~ s1) < max
j6=1;i
fhj(~ sj)g = hi(~ si) < h1(~ s1): (3)
for some vector ~ s 2 (0;1)n.
See proof in the Appendix.
In particular, the conditions in the above lemma are the same as in Lemma 5 plus
the assumption that n > 2 and that when the single crossing condition fails for Bidder
1 there exists a vector of types for which the rst best allocates the good to Bidder
1 but the second best allocates the good to either i or j. Note that we would expect
the conditions of the lemma to hold in general in the models of Section 4.1 and 4.2.
However, the above impossibility result does not necessarily hold once we move away
from the conditions of the above lemma. To see why, note the following generalization
of Example 6.
Example 7. N = f1;2;3g, v1(s) = s1 + 1
2 +(s2 +s3), v2(s) = s2 +2s1 +(s2 +s3),
v3(s) = s3 + 2s1 + (s2 + s3), and ei(si) = 0 for all i.
For these value functions we have that h1(s1) =  s1 + 1
2, g1(s1) = 0 and hi(si) =
gi(si) = si, i : 2;3. Note that the second best allocation is as in Example 6. Moreover,
for values of  close to zero, we expect that a variation of the arguments in Lemma 8
also show that the second best is not implementable with an English auction. However,
if  is suciently large, there is some multiplicity of equilibria that allows for an
equilibrium that avoids the possibility of a \rush" by making bidders bid suciently
low in information sets in which no bidder has quit yet. As next lemma shows, this is
enough to guarantee that the second best can be implemented with an English auction.
28Lemma 10. There exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in non-weakly dominated
strategies that implements the second best allocation in Example 7 when  = 1. In this
equilibrium:
 Bidder 1 bids s1 + 1
2, Bidder j 6= 1 bids 3sj + 2, in information sets in which no
bidder has left the auction yet.
 Bidder i, i = 2;3, bids 3si + 2p   1 in information sets in which Bidder 1 has
quit at price p.
 Bidder 1 bids s1 + 1
2 +
p 2
3 , and Bidder j 6= 1 bids 2sj +
p 2
3 + 2 in information
sets in which Bidder i 6= 1;j has quit at price p.
Proof. That the proposed strategies implement the second best is straightforward:
Bidder 1 quits rst, followed by the bidder with lower type between Bidder 2 and
Bidder 3. To show that it is an equilibrium, note that if Bidder 1 deviates and wins,
she pays a price equal to 2s2 +s3 +2 if s2  s3 (the other case is symmetric), which is
greater than her value s1 + s2 + s3 + 1=2, and thus makes the deviation unprotable.
Next note that if Bidder i, i 2 f2;3g deviates and wins the auction when the other
bidders follow the proposed strategy, Bidder i pays a price 3sj + s1, j 6= 1;i, which
is less that the value of Bidder i if and only if sj < si. Thus, Bidder i does not have
incentives to deviate since our proposed strategy makes her win in these cases, and
lose otherwise. 
Note that the strategies in the lemma are such that in information sets in which
no bidder has quit yet Bidder 1 bids as if the types of s2 and s3 were zero, whereas
Bidder 2 and Bidder 3 bid as if they both had the same type and Bidder 1 had her
highest possible type. Note also that Bidder 1 always quits rst.
In the previous examples of this section we assumed no externalities. As we shall
show next, externalities cause eciency losses in an English auction that go beyond the
problem of feasibility of the rst best. To illustrate this point we study two examples
in which the single crossing conditions holds and hence the rst best is feasible. The
rst example displays positive externalities and the second one negative externalities.
29Example 8. N = f1;2;3g, v1(s) = s1 + 1, v2(s) = s2 + 1, v3(s) = s3 + 1, e2(s2) =
e3(s3) = 0 and e1(s1) =  1=2.
Bidder 1 has a weakly dominant strategy, to quit at price b1(s1) = s1 + 1 and the
rst best ecient allocation is to allocate always to Bidder 1. But, this cannot occur
in an equilibrium in which Bidder 1 bids b1(s1) = s1 +1 because Bidder 2 with a type
s2 > 1=2 nds it strictly protable to outbid Bidder 1 for prices less than s2 + 1=2.
Clearly, Bidder 2 does not internalize the positive externality that allocating the good
to Bidder 1 has on Bidder 3.
Example 9. N = f1;2;3g, v1(s) = 2,26 v2(s) = s2 + 1, v3(s) = s3 + 1, e2(s2) =
e3(s3) = 0 and e1(s1) = 1.
Bidder 1 nds it weakly dominant to bid b1(s1) = 2 and the rst best ecient
allocation is that the good is allocated to Bidder 2 if s2  s3, and to Bidder 3,
otherwise. Note that when Bidder 1 bids b1(s1) = 2, Bidder i, i 2 f2;3g, with type
si nds it optimal to outbid Bidder 1 in any continuation game in which only Bidder
1 and i are active. In this case, Bidder i gets payos si + 1   2, which are negative if
si < 1. Thus, in any equilibrium in which Bidders 2 and Bidder 3 use this continuation
strategy, they both have strict incentives to quit rst when all bidders are still active.
Consequently, either Bidder 2 or Bidder 3 must quit with positive probability at price
0, which is incompatible with the rst best ecient allocation.
Intuitively, Bidder 2 and Bidder 3 do not want Bidder 1 to win, but they both
prefer that it is the other bidder who pays the high price necessary to outbid Bidder
1.27
26To make the argument more transparent, we have deviated slightly from the general assumptions
of Section 2 and we allow v1 to be constant on s1.
27A related argument was pointed out by Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) and Hoppe, Jehiel, and
Moldovanu (2006) to argue that externalities may induce strategic non participation in auctions.
307 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied mechanisms that maximize the expected social surplus
deriving from the sale of a (single-unit) object subject to Bayesian incentive com-
patibility constraints. An alternative approach for future research is the equivalent
analysis under ex post incentive compatible constraints. This alternative is especially
interesting since Ledyard (1978) and Bergemann and Morris (2005) have shown it to
be equivalent to Bayesian implementation for any possible prior. In this respect, it
is remarkable that the set of second best allocations subject to always selling that
we characterize always includes an allocation that satises the conditions provided by
Bikhchandani, Chatterji, and Sen (2006) for ex post implementability.28
This extension, however, presents additional diculties. The reason is that sec-
ond best eciency requires trading o between dierent inecient allocations. Under
Bayesian implementation, the common prior gives natural weights for trading-o these
inecient allocations, but this is not the case under ex post implementation.
28This may be shown by noting that an allocation such that for any s, pi(s) = 1 if gi(si) =
maxj2Nfgj(sj)g and i  argmaxj2Nfgj(sj)g satises the conditions in Proposition 2 and since the gi's
are increasing, it also satises the conditions for ex post implementability provided by Bikhchandani,
Chatterji, and Sen (2006).
31Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We rst prove the \only if"-part. Suppose a feasible allocation p. Then, there
exists a direct mechanism (p;x) for which:
















i 2 Si, i 2 N. Hence, we have that for si > s0

















Thus, Qi(si;p)  Qi(s0
i;p) as desired.
To prove the \if"-part, suppose an allocation p for which Qi(:;p) is increasing, for
all i 2 N. Note rst that by assumption i(:) is a strictly increasing function, and
thus invertible in [i(0);i(1)]. Let ~ Vi(y) 
R y
i(0) Qi( 1
i (~ y);p)d~ y for y 2 [i(0);i(1)]
and,
xi(s)  Qi(si;p)i(si) +
X
j6=i
(pi(si;s i)qj(sj)   ej(sj)pj(si;s i))   ~ Vi(i(si));
for any s 2 S. This means that 	i(si;p;x) = ~ Vi(i(si))   Qi(si;p)i(si), for any
si 2 Si, and hence that ~ Vi(i(si)) = Ui(si;si) for the direct mechanism (p;x). We
shall show that this direct mechanism satises the Bayesian incentive compatibility
32constraints. To see why, note that for any si;s0
i 2 Si























where the inequality is a consequence of ~ Vi being a convex function and Qi( 1
i (y);p) 2
@ ~ Vi(y) by denition of ~ Vi. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Substracting
P
j qj(sj) from the two sides of the inequalities that dene the
single crossing condition, one gets that the single crossing condition is equivalent to
say that for any i 2 N, s 2 S and s0
i 2 Si such that s0
i > si:
hi(si) > maxfhj(sj)gj6=i implies hi(s0
i)  maxfhj(sj)gj6=i: (4)
This is equivalent to say that for any i 2 N, si;s0
i 2 Si and s0
i > si, it is veried
that Ai(si)  Bi(s0
i) for Ai(si)  fs i 2 S i : hi(si) > maxfhj(sj)gj6=ig and Bi(s0
i) 
fs i 2 S i : hi(s0
i)  maxfhj(sj)gj6=ig. This is equivalent to say that for any i 2 N,
si;s0
i 2 Si and s0
i > si, it is veried that Ai(si) \ [S i n Bi(s0
i)] = ;, which corresponds
to the condition in the lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. For the sucient part, note that an allocation such that pi(s) = 0 if hi(si) 6=
maxj2N hj(sj), and pi(s) = 1
m(s), otherwise, where m(s) denotes the cardinality of
fk 2 N : hk(sk) = maxj2N hj(sj)g is rst best ecient and satisfy the feasibility
conditions of Lemma 1 if the condition in the Lemma 2 is satised.
Next, let Ji(si)  fs i : maxfhj(sj)gj6=i  hi(si)g, Ji(si)  fs i : maxfhj(sj)gj6=i <




j6=i fj(sj)ds i for A  S i. Note that for any rst best e-
33cient allocation p:





We prove the necessary part by contradiction. Suppose that the single crossing
condition does not hold. Then, by Lemma 2 there exists a bidder i 2 N with types
s0
i > si and a vector s i 2 S i such that maxfhj(sj)gj6=i 2 (hi(s0
i);hi(si)). By either
right or left continuity of the hj(:)'s, there exists an open set O  S i such that
maxfhj(s0
j)gj6=i 2 (hi(s0
i);hi(si)) for any s0
 i 2 O. By denition, Ji(s0
i) \ O = ; and
Ji(s0

















 i (Ji(si))  Qi(si;p);
which implies a violation of the feasibility conditions of Lemma 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2





















(hi(si)   gi(si))pi(s)ds =
Z
Si










(Hi(si)   Gi(si)) dQi(si;p):
Consequently, the expressions in Equation (5) are equal to the expression in Equa-
tion (1) as desired.
It is easy to see that an allocation that always sells maximizes the rst integral in
the equation above if and only it satises (i). Moreover, since Qi(:;p) is increasing for
any p feasible by Lemma 1, and Gi(si)  Hi(si), by Lemma 3 (c), a feasible allocation
34maximizes the second integral if and only if it satises (ii). This completes the proof
since the set of feasible allocations that always sell and satisfy (i) and (ii) is not empty.
For instance, pi(s) = 0 if gi(si) 6= maxj2N gj(sj), and otherwise, pi(s) = 1
m(s), where
m(s) denotes the cardinality of fk 2 N : gk(sk) = maxj2N gj(sj)g. The monotonicity
of gi(si) ensures that the allocation is feasible. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. Basically, repeat the proof of Proposition 2 noting that when maxi2N gi(si) +
Pn
j=1 qj(s)  0 for any s, the constraint
Pn
i=1 pi(s) = 1 is not binding. 
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. The function gi cannot be discontinuous at points in an open interval in which
Gi(si) = Hi(si) by continuity of hi, or at points in an open interval in which Gi(si) 6=
Hi(si) by Lemma 3 (d). Take now a point s
i 2 (0;1) and an open interval O that
includes s
i and such that Hi(si) = Gi(si) if si 2 O and si < s
i and Hi(si) > Gi(si)
if si 2 O and si > s
i (the other case is symmetric). Then the left derivative of Gi
is equal to hi(s
i) and the right derivative is bounded above by hi(s
i). Moreover, by
the convexity of Gi the left derivative of Gi must be less than or equal to the right
derivative. As a consequence, Gi is dierentiable at s
i and its dierential gi(s
i) is
equal to hi(s
i). Continuity at 0 and 1 together with the last two items of the lemma
are direct consequences of Lemma 3 (b) and (c) and the boundedness of hi. 
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. By the same argument as in Example 4, Bidder 1 has a unique weakly dominant
strategy, to bid until b1(s1)  t1(s1)+q1(s1). We show next that the resulting allocation
when Bidder 1 bids b1(s1) and Bidder 2 plays a best response to b1(s1) is second best
ecient. First, note that b1 is continuous and strictly increasing, and hence, its inverse
b 1
1 exists. Bidder 2 wins the auction with a bid b if and only if s1  b 1
1 (b). Thus,





















(h2(s2)   h1(~ s1))d~ s1  
Z 1
0




(g2(s2)   g1(~ s1))d~ s1  
 
H1(b 1







where in the third step we have used that h2 is increasing under the assumptions of
the lemma and thus g2(s2) = h2(s2).
Let s2
1(s2) be the maximum of the set fs1 2 [0;1] : g1(s1) = g2(s2)g if non-empty;
s2
1(s2) = 1, if g2(s2) > g1(1); and s2
1(s2) = 0, if g2(s2) < g1(0). Note that b = b1(s2
1(s2))
maximizes the last expression, and in particular the rst two terms. That it maximizes
the rst term is direct from the denition of s2
1. To show that it also maximizes the
second term, note that by Lemma 3 (c), this second term can only be negative or zero.
Thus, it is sucient to show that for b = b1(s2
1(s2)) it is equal to zero. This is direct
from the denition of s2
1 and Lemma 3 (b) and (d). Consequently, any maximum
to the above expression must maximize the rst two terms. We shall show that this
implies that the induced allocation satises both conditions in Proposition 2. The
maximization of the rst term implies directly condition (i). Condition (ii) holds
trivially for i = 2 since g2 = h2, i.e. G2 = H2. Finally, note that the maximization of
the second term implies that no type of Bidder 2 bids at points in which H1(b 1
1 (b)) >
G1(b 1
1 (b)), and thus condition (ii) is also satised for i = 1. 
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. We only prove the rst item. The second one is simply the negation of the rst
one. We rst show the \if" part. Consider rst the case g1(0) > g2(1). By monotonicity
of the bid functions, we only need to show that g1(0) > g2(1) implies that b1(0)  b2(1).
Note that it is easy to see that b1(0)   b2(1) = 1(0) + 2(1)   (2(1) + 1(0)) =
h1(0) h2(1), which is greater than g1(0) g2(1) by Lemma 4, and thus non-negative
36as desired. Consider now the case g1(0)  g2(1). In this case, g1(s1)  g2(s2) and
continuity of the gi's, see Lemma 4, implies that there exists a s0



































































show the former inequality since the latter one has a symmetric proof. Lemma 3 (d),
Lemma 4 (a) and the denition of s2
1 implies that if s2
1(s0





2)). Thus, by Lemma 4, we only need to show that if s2
1(s0
2) = 1 then it cannot
be that G1(1   ) < H1(1   ) for any  close to zero. By contradiction, suppose that
s2
1(s0
2) = 1 and G1(1 ) < H1(1 ) for any  close to zero. Then, g2(s0
2) = g1(1) and
g1(s1) is 
at for any s1 in (1 ;1] by Lemma 3 (d), which contradicts that s2
1(s0
2) = 1.














We prove the \only if" part by contradiction. We shall show that g2(s2) > g1(s1)
implies that b2(s2) > b1(s1). The proof is similar to the \if" part. The case g2(0) >
g1(1) is symmetric to the case g1(0) > g2(1) above. In the case g2(0)  g1(1), g2(s2) >
g1(s1) implies that there exists a strictly decreasing sequence fs2;mg starting at s2
and a strictly increasing sequence fs1;mg starting at s1 with respective limits s0
2 and
s0








2). Note that along the
sequence g2(s2;m) > g1(s1;m) and hence, s2;m  s1
2(s1;m) and s1;m  s2
1(s2;m). Using





































which by the same arguments as in the "if" part is non-negative as desired. 
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. That the allocation induced by (b
1;b
2) satises condition (i) in Proposition 2 is
direct from Lemma 6. To check condition (ii), note that for the allocation induced by
(b
1;b





since ties occur with zero probability. Thus, in any open interval in which H1(s1) >
G1(s1) Lemma 3 (d) implies that Q1(s1;p) is constant as required by condition (ii). A
similar argument shows that Q2 also satises (ii). 
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We only show that Bidder 1 nds it optimal to bid according to b
1 when Bidder 2
plays b
2. The corresponding proof for Bidder 2 is similar. Let u1(s1;b) be the expected
utility of Bidder 1 when she has a private type s1, submits a bid b, and Bidder 2 uses
the bid function b
2. We only show that Bidder 1 does not have incentives to deviate
downwards, i.e. u1(s1;b
1(s1))  u1(s1;b)  0 for b < b
1(s1). The analysis of incentives
to deviate upwards, i.e. b > b
1(s1), is symmetric. Downward deviations only aect
payos when Bidder 1 wins with b
1(s1) and loses with b, i.e. when29 b
2(s2) 2 (b;b
1(s1)].
Recall also from Lemma 6 that b
1(s1)  b
2(s2) is equivalent to g1(s1)  g2(s2), which
29Note that ties occur with probability zero and thus the conclusions do not change whether con-
sidering the boundaries of the interval of bids close or open.
38implies: (a) s1  s2
1(s2) and (b) g1(s2
1(s2))  g2(s2). Moreover, by monotonicity of
the bid functions we have that fs2 : b
2(s2) 2 (b;b
1(s1)]g = fs2 : s2 2 (2(b);s1
2(s1)]g
for some 2(b) 2 [0;s1
2(s1)]. Note also that if Bidder 1 wins, she gets a good with
value v1(s1;s2) and pays Bidder 2's bid and if Bidder 1 loses she suers a negative




1(s2)) = 1(s1) + 2(s2)   2(s2)   1(s2
1(s2)). Thus,
u1(s1;b





































(g2(s2)   h2(s2)) ds2
where we use that 1 is strictly increasing and (a) in the rst inequality. As for the
second inequality, we use that h1(s2
1(s2))  g1(s2
1(s2)) and (b). To see why h1(s2
1(s2)) 
g1(s2
1(s2)), we argue by contradiction. Suppose that h1(s2
1(s2)) < g1(s2
1(s2)), then
Lemma 4 implies that s2
1(s2) > 0 and thus by continuity there exists an interval
(a;s2
1(s2)], with a 6= s2
1(s2) such that any s1 in this interval veries that h1(s1) < g1(s1)
and hence that H1(s1) 6= G1(s1). By application of Lemma 3 (d) we have that g1(s1)
is constant in (a;s2
1(s2)], which contradicts the denition of s2
1(s2).
Finally, we argue that
R s1
2(s1)







+ [H2(2(b))   G2(2(b))]:
The second dierence is non-negative by Lemma 3 (c). We next argue that the rst
one is equal to zero. If s1
2(s1) is either zero or one, this is because of Lemma 3 (b);
otherwise, it is because G2(s1
2(s1)) < H2(s1
2(s1)) would imply that g2 is constant around
s1
2(s1) by Lemma 3 (d), which is a contradiction with the denition of s1
2(s1). 
39Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Since any increasing function can be discontinuous in at most countably many
points and si
j is increasing, it is sucient to show that at any point si 2 [0;1] for
which si
j(si) < si
j(si), the function si
j is discontinuous. To prove so, suppose a point
si at which   si
j(si)   si
j(si) > 0. Then, by denition of si
j and si
j, the function
gj is constant and equal to gi(si) in the interval (si
j(si);si
j(si)). This means that gi
is strictly increasing at si since it cannot be constant because K1 \ K2 = ;. Hence,
si
j(si) < si
j(si+), and consequently si
j(si)+ < si
j(si+), for any  > 0. This implies
that si
j is discontinuous at si. 
Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 8, we refer to an equilibrium in non-weakly dominated
strategies simply as an equilibrium. We denote by b1(s1)  t1(s1) + q1(s1) Bidder 1's
unique weakly dominant strategy. Finally, note that under the assumptions of the
lemma, the functions hi's, i 6= 1, are strictly increasing (since hi = i) and thus
hi = gi for i 6= 1.
The proof is also sketched in two steps. We rst provide three necessary conditions
that must be satised in an equilibrium that implements the second best:30
(i) For any vector of types s 2 [0;1]n that satises:
g1(s1) < max
j6=f1;ig
fhj(sj)g < hi(si) < h1(s1);
only Bidder i and 1 can be active along the equilibrium path when the price is
equal to b1(s1). We prove the claim by contradiction. We shall argue that if
Bidder 1, Bidder i, and Bidder l 6= f1;ig are active at a price p  b1(s1) in the
equilibrium path induced by the above vector of types, then both Bidder i and l
quit immediately if Bidder 1 quits. Hence, there is a tie and thus a contradiction
30The structure of the proof generalizes the proof of Lemma 8. Basically, the necessary condition
(i) corresponds to the rst step in the proof of Lemma 8, the necessary conditions (ii) and (iii) only
play an auxiliary role, and what follows corresponds to the second step.
40since our tie-breaking rule does not ensure the second best allocation. To under-
stand why Bidder i quits immediately after Bidder 1 in the previous argument,
note rst that in the equilibrium path Bidder i infers from Bidder 1 quitting at
price p that Bidder 1's type is equal to s1. Thus, Bidder i infers that her value
is equal to ti(si) + q1(s1), which is strictly less than the price p = b1(s1) since
ti(si)+q1(s1) b1(s1) = ti(si)+q1(s1) t1(s1) q1(s1) = hi(si) h1(s1) < 0:
(6)
Note also that by a similar argument Bidder l also infers that her value is less
than the price. This explains why both Bidder i and l must quit immediately
after Bidder 1 in equilibrium.
(ii) Bidder i, i 6= 1, with type si does not win at a price p > b1(si
1(si)) in the
equilibrium path when Bidder 1 bids p, and thus has a type s1  b 1
1 (p) > si
1(si).
The reason is that the implemented allocation would not be second best because
s1 > si
1(si) implies that g1(s1) > gi(si).
(iii) Bidder i, i 6= 1, with type si does not win in the equilibrium path at a price
strictly greater than ti(si)+q1(b 1
1 (p)) when Bidder 1 quits at a price p and thus
has a type s1 = b 1
1 (p). The reason is that Bidder i does not nd it protable to
win at these prices, and hence she would have a protable deviation, to quit at
price ti(si)+q1(b 1
1 (p)) if higher than p, or immediately after Bidder 1 otherwise.
We complete the proof by showing that there is a protable deviation when Bidder
1 uses her unique weakly dominant strategy and all the other bidders a vector of
strategies that veries conditions (i)-(iii) above and that allocates the good according
to the second best.
Let ~ s 2 (0;1)n be a vector that veries the conditions in the statement of the lemma.
The protable deviation exists for a Bidder i, i 6= 1, with type ~ si. To describe it, let
sinf(si) denote the inmum of the set fs1 : hi(si) < h1(s1)g if not empty and note that
sinf(si) is right-continuous since h1 and hi are continuous and hi increasing. Thus, there
exists an ^  > 0 small enough such that hi(~ si) < h1(s1) for any s1 2 (sinf(~ si);sinf(~ si+^ )].
41The proposed deviation is that Bidder i with type ~ si plays the action prescribed
by her strategy but for a type31 ~ si + ^  (rather than her true type ~ si) unless either of
the following two cases occur: (a) that the price reaches b1(si
1(~ si)) when Bidder 1 is
active; or (b) that Bidder 1 has already quit at price p, and the price is equal or above
ti(~ si) + q1(b 1
1 (p)). In either of these two cases, the deviation prescribes that Bidder i
quits immediately.
Since the original strategies implemented the second best and satisfy (ii) and (iii)
this deviation lets Bidder i win in all the cases in which she was already winning with
the original strategy (and at the same price). Moreover, Bidder i's deviation lets her
win in some additional cases. To simplify the description of these additional cases, we
shall restrict in what follows to the symmetric case in which hl = hk for any l;k 6= 1
(and thus gl = gk). The extension to the general case is straightforward but requires
a cumbersome notation. Thus, the only additional cases in which i may win with the
deviation are when the maximum of the other bidders types but 1 is in (~ si; ~ si+^ ), and
Bidder 1 has a type less than si
1(~ si), see a) above. The original strategy did not let i
win in these cases because it is not second best ecient. We show next what happens
under the deviation in these cases depending on the value of Bidder 1's type s1:
 If s1 2 [0;sinf(~ si)]: then, hi(~ si)  h1(s1) and thus, ti(~ si) + q1(s1)  b1(s1) by
a similar argument as in Equation (6). As a consequence, condition (b) above
ensures that i gets non-negative payos with the deviation if she wins.
 If s1 2 (sinf(~ si);sinf(~ si + ^ )]: then, hi(~ si) < h1(s1) by denition of ^ , or equiv-
alently ti(~ si) + q1(s1)   b1(s1) < 0, again by a similar argument as in Equation
(6). Thus condition (b) above means that i quits immediately after 1 if i is still
active and as a consequence, if i wins, she pays 1's bid.
 If s1 2 (sinf(~ si + ^ );si
1(~ si)], Bidder i wins with the deviation and pays 1's bid.
This is because condition (i) implies that only Bidder 1 and i are active when
31The reason why the proof of this lemma is more complex than the proof of Lemma 8 is that we
must make sure that the game does not move to an out-of-equilibrium path after the deviation since
conditions (i)-(iii) only apply in the equilibrium path.
42the price goes above b1(sinf(~ si + ^ )). To see why condition (i) applies, note that
s1  si
1(~ si) means that g1(s1)  gi(~ si) and that gi(si) = hi(~ si)  hi(~ si + ^ ) since
hi is increasing. Moreover, for any s1 arbitrarily close but above sinf(~ si + ^ ), we
have hi(~ si+^ ) < h1(s1). Putting together these facts, we get g1(s1) < hi(~ si+^ ) <
h1(s1) as required.
Denote by (s1) the probability with which i wins conditional on s1 and on the
maximum of fsjgj6=1;i being in (~ si; ~ si +^ ) when i plays her deviation and all the other
bidders follow the proposed strategies. Note that our previous arguments imply that
(s1) = 1 if s1 2 (sinf(~ si +^ );si
1(~ si)]. We next use  to show that Bidder i gets strictly




















(hi(~ si)   g1(s1)) ds1 =
 
G1(si
1(~ si))   H1(si
1(~ si))









(hi(~ si)   g1(s1)) ds1 > 0;
where in the rst inequality we use that (s1) = 1 if s1 2 (sinf(~ si + ^ );si
1(~ si)] and that
hi(~ si) < h1(s1) for s1 2 (sinf(~ si);sinf(~ si+^ )] by denition of ^ ; in the second inequality
we use the same arguments as in the last paragraph of the proof of Proposition 4; and
in the last inequality we use that gi(~ si)  g1(s1) (and that hi = gi) for s1  si
1(~ si),
and strictly if s1 2 (sinf(~ si);si
1(~ si)) by denition of si
1 and si
1. Note (sinf(~ si);si
1(~ si)) is
non-empty because sinf(~ si) < ~ s1 and ~ s1 < si
1(~ si). The former inequality can be proved
using that the vector ~ s veries Equation (3) and the denition of sinf, and the latter
one using also that ~ s veries Equation (3) and the denition of si
1.
43As a consequence, the proposed deviation is protable as desired. 
B Multidimensional Type Models
In this appendix we extend our analysis to a family of problems with a multidimensional
type space. We shall show that under certain assumptions the analysis of these models
can be done with an equivalent model with a one-dimensional type space. This analysis
allows the extension of the models in Section 4.
Suppose that Bidder i's private information is a three dimensional vector ^ si =
(^ ti; ^ qi; ^ ei) that it is drawn according to an independent distribution ^ Fi with support in
a bounded set ^ Si  R3. We shall assume that this distribution is such that the induced
distribution of ^ ti+^ qi, say Fi, has a strictly positive density fi in all the support Si  R.
Denote by ^ S =
Qn
i=1 ^ Si and by S =
Qn
i=1 Si. We assume that Bidder i gets utility
^ ti +
Pn
j=1 ^ qj   b if she wins and pays b, and utility  ^ ej   b if j 6= i wins and Bidder i
pays b.
By the revelation principle, there is no loss of generality in restricting to direct
mechanisms. A direct mechanism is a pair (^ p; ^ x), where ^ p : ^ S ! [0;1]n and ^ x : ^ S ! Rn
such that
Pn
i=1 ^ pi(^ s)  1 and where ^ pi(^ s) denotes the probability that Bidder i gets
the good and ^ xi(^ s) denotes the payments of i to the auctioneer when the announced
vector of types is equal to ^ s. We shall refer to ^ p as an allocation.
The expected utility of Bidder i with type ^ si that reports ^ s0
i when all the other
bidders report truthfully is equal to:
^ Ui(^ si; ^ s0
i)  ^ Qi(^ s0
i; ^ p)(^ ti + ^ qi) + ^ 	i(^ s0
i; ^ p; ^ x);
where
^ Qi(^ si; ^ p) 
Z
^ S i
^ pi(^ si; ^ s i)d ^ F i(^ s i);
and,




@^ pi(^ si; ^ s i)
X
j6=i
^ qj   ^ xi(^ si; ^ s i)  
X
j6=i
^ pj(^ si; ^ s i)^ ej
1
A d ^ F i(^ s i);
for ^ F i(^ s i) 
Q
j6=i ^ Fj(^ sj) and ^ S i 
Q
j6=i ^ Sj.
44Thus, we say that an allocation ^ p : S ! [0;1]n is feasible if there exists a di-
rect mechanism (^ p; ^ x) that satises the following Bayesian incentive compatibility con-
straint:
^ Ui(^ si; ^ si) = sup
^ s0
i2^ Si
f^ Ui(^ si; ^ s0
i)g;
for all ^ si 2 ^ Si and i 2 N.
We shall show that we can study second best eciency in the model of this section,
using the results in the model of Section 2:
Denition: Let the following be the uni-dimensional equivalent to a model as in
Section 2 in which for all i 2 N and si 2 Si:











d ^ Fi(^ si)
fi(si)




d ^ Fi(^ si)
fi(si)
;
where ^ Si(si)  f^ si 2 ^ Si : ^ ti + ^ qi = sig.









d ^ Fn(^ sn)
fn(sn)
:::
d ^ F1(^ s1)
f1(s1)
:
Lemma 11. The allocation ^ p is feasible if and only if its uni-dimensional version p
is feasible and ^ Qi(^ si; ^ p) 2 [Qi(^ ti + ^ qi;p) ;Qi(^ ti + ^ qi;p)+] for any ^ si 2 ^ Si and i 2 N.32










respectively. To avoid problems at the inmum and supremum of Si, we shall adopt the convention
that Qi(inf Si;p)
  = Qi(inf Si;p) and Qi(supSi;p)
+ = Qi(supSi;p). We adopt the same notation
and conventions for the functions Qi in the proof of the lemma.




^ Qi(^ si; ^ p)
d ^ Fi(^ si)
fi(si)
where p is the uni-dimensional version of ^ p. Thus, by application of Lemma 1, p is
feasible and ^ Qi(^ si; ^ p) 2 [Qi(^ ti+^ qi;p) ;Qi(^ ti+^ qi;p)+] if and only if there exists a vector
of increasing functions Qi : Si ! [0;1], i 2 N, such that ^ Qi(^ si; ^ p) 2 [Qi(ti+qi) ;Qi(ti+
qi)+] for any ^ si 2 ^ Si and i 2 N, or what is the same, if and only if there exists a set of
increasing convex functions ^ vi : Si ! R+, i 2 N, such that ^ Qi(^ si; ^ p) 2 @^ v(^ ti + ^ qi) for
any ^ si 2 ^ Si and i 2 N, see Rockafellar (1970).
Thus, to prove the lemma it is sucient to show the following equivalent statement:
The allocation ^ p is feasible if and only if there exists a set of increasing
convex functions ^ vi : Si ! R+, i 2 N, such that ^ Qi(^ si; ^ p) 2 @^ v(^ ti + ^ qi) for
any ^ si 2 ^ Si and i 2 N.
We rst prove the \only if"-part. Suppose a feasible allocation ^ p : ^ S ! [0;1]n,
and let Vi(^ si)  ^ Ui(^ si; ^ si). Then,
Vi(^ si)  ^ Ui(^ si; ^ s0
i)
= ^ Qi(^ s0
i; ^ p)(^ ti + ^ qi) + ^ 	i(^ s0
i; ^ p; ^ x)
= ^ Qi(^ s0
i; ^ p)(^ t0
i + ^ q0
i) + ^ 	i(^ s0
i; ^ p; ^ x) + ^ Qi(^ s0
i; ^ p)(^ ti + ^ qi   ^ t0
i   ^ q0
i)
= Vi(^ s0
i) + ^ Qi(^ s0
i; ^ p)(^ ti + ^ qi   ^ t0
i   ^ q0
i);
for all ^ si; ^ s0
i 2 ^ Si, i 2 N, and some ^ x : ^ S ! Rn.
The above inequality applied twice, one with the roles of ^ si and ^ s0
i interchanged,
to any two vectors ^ si; ^ s0
i 2 ^ Si such that ^ ti + ^ qi = ^ t0
i + ^ q0
i, implies that Vi(^ si) = Vi(^ s0
i).
Consequently, there exists a function vi : Si ! R such that Vi(^ si) = vi(^ ti + ^ qi) for
any ^ si 2 ^ Si. Moreover, vi is convex because Vi is convex. Note that Vi must be
convex because it is equal to the maximum of some linear functions by the incentive
compatibility constraint. Finally, note that the above inequality together with the
denition of vi implies that vi(y)  vi(^ ti + ^ qi)+ ^ Qi(^ si; ^ p)(y  (^ ti + ^ qi)) for any y in Si.
This means that ^ Qi(^ si; ^ p) 2 @vi(^ ti + ^ qi) as desired.
46To prove the \if"-part, suppose a function ~ v that satises the conditions of the
lemma for an allocation ^ p, and let ^ x : ^ S ! Rn be such that ^ 	i(^ si; ^ p; ^ x) = ^ vi(^ ti +
^ qi)   (^ ti + ^ qi) ^ Qi(^ si; ^ p) for any i 2 N. We shall show that the direct mechanism (^ p; ^ x)
satises the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints. To see why, note that for
any ^ si; ^ s0
i 2 ^ Si:
Vi(^ si) = ~ vi(^ ti + ^ qi)  ~ vi(^ t0
i + ^ q0
i) + ^ Qi(^ s0
i; ^ p)(^ ti + ^ qi   ^ t0
i   ^ q0
i)
= ^ Qi(^ s0
i; ^ p)(^ t0
i + ^ q0
i) + ^ 	i(^ s0
i; ^ p; ^ x) + ^ Qi(^ s0
i; ^ p)(^ ti + ^ qi   ^ t0
i   ^ q0
i)
= ^ Qi(^ s0
i; ^ p)(^ ti + ^ qi) + ^ 	i(^ s0
i; ^ p; ^ x) = ^ Ui(^ si; ^ s0
i);
where the inequality is a consequence of ^ Qi(^ s0
i; ^ p) 2 @~ vi(^ t0
i + ^ q0
i). 
Now, we can state the main result of this appendix:










^ qj   (n   1)^ ei
1
A ^ pi(^ s)d ^ F(^ s);
subject to ^ p feasible and
P
i2N ^ pi(^ s) = 1 for all ^ s 2 ^ S, if and only if its uni-dimensional
version p is second best ecient subject to always selling for the uni-dimensional
equivalent model.
Proof. Take any ^ p feasible and such that
P
i2N ^ pi(^ s) = 1 for all ^ s 2 ^ S, and denote
by p its one-dimensional version. Then we can deduce the lemma from the following
sequence of algebraic transformations and the fact that by Lemma 11, feasibility of ^ p









^ qj   (n   1)^ ei
1






^ ti   (n   1)^ ei















^ ti   (n   1)^ ei













^ ti   (n   1)^ ei
 ^ Qi(^ si; ^ p)















^ ti   (n   1)^ ei
 ^ Qi(^ si; ^ p)






































































qj(sj)   (n   1)ei(si)
1
Api(s)f(s)ds;
where we have used: in step 2, that
Pn
j=1 ^ p(^ s) = 1; in step 4, independency of the ^ Fi's;
in Step 5, that ^ Qi(^ si; ^ p) = Qi(si;p) a.e., see below; and in step 7, that
Pn
i=1 pi(s) = 1.
To see why ^ Qi(^ si; ^ p) = Qi(si;p) a.e., note that Lemma 11 and ^ p feasible imply
that p is feasible, and thus Qi(:;p) increasing by Lemma 1, and hence continuous a.e.
As a consequence, applying Lemma 11 again we get that ^ Qi(^ si; ^ p) = Qi(si;p). 
Finally, we provide as an application an example that generalizes the model in
Section 4.2 to the cases not covered there, i.e.  + t  t.
Example 10. Suppose a set N = f1;2;:::;ng, and that ^ F1 has full support on ^ S1 =
[t;t]f0;gf0g and ^ Fi on ^ Si = [t;t]f0gf0g for i 6= 1. Suppose also that ^ t1 and
48^ q1 are independent and ^ t1 has a marginal distribution G with strictly positive density g
over the support and ^ q1 takes value 0 with probability  2 (0;1) and  with probability
1   . Finally, suppose  + t  t.
In the above example q1(s1) = 
g(s1 )(1 )
g(s1)+g(s1 )(1 ), if s1 >  and zero, otherwise;
t1(s1) = s1   q1(s1), e1(s1) = 0, ti(si) = si, qi(si) = ei(s1) = 0 for i 6= 1. Thus,
its uni-dimensional version violates the single crossing condition. To see why, apply
Lemma 2 to s1 =  + t    and s0
1 =  + t +  noting that h1(s1) = t1(s1), and thus
that h1( + t   ) =  + t    >  + t +    q1( + t + ) = h1( + t + ) for  > 0 and
small enough.
49Supplementary Material
Supplementary material to Footnote 17.
Example: N = f1;2g, vi(s) = 20  1[:9;1](sj) + (si + sj) + 1[1=2;1](si) + 1[1=2;1](sj) and
ei(si) = 0.
In this example, note that hi(si) =  20  1[:9;1] and qi(si) = 20  1[:9;1](si) + si +
1[1=2;1](si). Thus, Hi(si) =  20  1[:9;1](si   :9). Consequently, Gi(si) =  2  si and
gi(si) =  2. Hence, it is easy to see that gi(si) + qi(si) + qj(sj) > 0 if si + sj > 1




0 (p1(s) + p2(s)) ds1 ds2 > 1=2 and the latter that Qi(si;p)  :1 if si < :1 for any
an allocation that maximizes the rst integral in Equation (1). Moreover, it is also easy
to see that any allocation that maximizes the second integral in Equation (1) requires
that the Qi(:;p)'s are constant. Hence any allocation that maximizes both integrals









:1 + :1, which is a contradiction.
Omitted steps in the Proof of Proposition 4
We provide here the three omitted steps in the Proof of Lemma 4 in the Appendix.
1) No upward deviation from the equilibrium strategy is protable for Bidder 1.
Proof. We show here that Bidder 1 does not have incentives to deviate upwards, i.e.
u1(s1;b
1(s1))   u1(s1;b)  0 for b > b
1(s1). Upward deviations only aect payos
when Bidder 1 loses with b
1(s1) and wins with b, i.e. when 33 b
2(s2) 2 (b
1(s1);b).
Recall also from Lemma 6 that b
2(s2) > b
1(s1) is equivalent to g2(s2) > g1(s1), which
implies: (a) s1 < s2
1(s2) and (b) g1(s2
1(s2))  g2(s2). Moreover, by monotonicity of
the bid functions we have that fs2 : b
2(s2) 2 (b
1(s1);b)g = fs2 : s2 2 (s1
2(s1);2(b))g
for some 2(b) 2 (s1
2(s1);1]. Note also that if Bidder 1 wins, she gets a good with
value v1(s1;s2) and pays Bidder 2's bid and if Bidder 1 loses she suers a negative
33Note that ties occur with probability zero and thus the conclusions do not change whether con-
sidering the boundaries of the interval of bids close or open.












































(g2(s2)   h2(s2)) ds2
where we use that 1 is strictly increasing and (a) in the rst inequality. As for the
second inequality, we use that h1(s2
1(s2))  g1(s2
1(s2)) and (b). To see why h1(s2
1(s2)) 
g1(s2
1(s2)), we argue by contradiction. Suppose that h1(s2
1(s2)) > g1(s2
1(s2)), then
Lemma 4 implies that s2
1(s2) < 1 and thus by continuity there exists an interval
[s2
1(s2);a) with a 6= s2
1(s2) such that any s1 in this interval veries that h1(s1) < g1(s1)
and hence that H1(s1) 6= G1(s1). By application of Lemma 3 (d) we have that g1(s1)
is constant in (a;s2
1(s2)], which contradicts the denition of s2
1(s2).






+ [G2(2(b))   H2(2(b))]:
The second dierence is non-positive by Lemma 3 (c). We next argue that the rst one
is equal to zero. If s1
2(s1) is either zero or one, this is because of Lemma 3 (b); otherwise,
it is because G2(s1
2(s1)) < H2(s1
2(s1)) would imply that g2 is constant around s1
2(s1)
by Lemma 3 (d), which is a contradiction with the denition of s1
2(s1). 
2) No downward deviation from the equilibrium strategy is protable for Bidder 2.
Proof. We show here that Bidder 2 does not have incentives to deviate downwards, i.e.
u2(s2;b
2(s2))   u2(s2;b)  0 for b < b
2(s2) Downward deviations only aect payos
51when Bidder 2 wins with b
2(s2) and loses with b, i.e. when34 b
1(s1) 2 (b;b
2(s2)).
Recall also from Lemma 6 that b
1(s1) < b
2(s2) is equivalent to g1(s1) < g2(s2), which
implies: (a) s2 > s1
2(s1) and (b) g2(s1
2(s1))  g1(s1). Moreover, by monotonicity of
the bid functions we have that fs1 : b
1(s1) 2 (b;b
2(s2))g = fs1 : s1 2 (1(b);s2
1(s2))g
for some 1(b) 2 [0;s2
1(s2)). Note also that if Bidder 2 wins, she gets a good with
value v2(s2;s1) and pays Bidder 1's bid and if Bidder 2 loses she suers a negative




2(s1)) = 2(s2) + 1(s1)   1(s1)   2(s1
2(s1)). Thus,
u2(s2;b





































(g1(s1)   h1(s1)) ds1
where we use that 2 is strictly increasing and (a) in the rst inequality. As for the
second inequality, we use that h2(s1
2(s1))  g2(s1
2(s1)) and (b). To see why h2(s1
2(s1)) 
g2(s1
2(s1)), we argue by contradiction. Suppose that h2(s1
2(s1)) < g2(s1
2(s1)), then
Lemma 4 implies that s1
2(s1) > 0 and thus by continuity there exists an interval
(a;s1
2(s1)] with a 6= s1
2(s1) such that any s2 in this interval veries that h2(s2) < g2(s2)
and hence that H2(s2) 6= G2(s2). By application of Lemma 3 (d) we have that g2(s2)
is constant in (a;s1
2(s1)] which contradicts the denition of s1
2(s1).






+ [H1(1(b))   G1(1(b))]:
34Note that ties occur with probability one and thus the conclusions do not change whether consid-
ering the boundaries of the interval of bids close or open.
52The second dierence is non-negative by Lemma 3 (c). We next argue that the rst
one is equal to zero. If s2
1(s2) is either zero or one, this is because of Lemma 3 (b);
otherwise, it is because G1(s2
1(s2)) < H1(s2
1(s2)) would imply that g1 is constant around
s2
1(s2) by Lemma 3 (d), which is a contradiction with the denition of s2
1(s2). 
3) No upward deviation from the equilibrium strategy is protable for Bidder 2.
Proof. We show here that Bidder 2 does not have incentives to deviate upwards, i.e.
u2(s2;b
2(s2))   u2(s2;b)  0 for b > b
2(s2). Upward deviations only aect payos
when Bidder 2 loses with b
2(s2) and wins with b, i.e. when 35 b
1(s1) 2 [b
2(s2);b).
Recall also from Lemma 6 that b
1(s1)  b
2(s2) is equivalent to g1(s1)  g2(s2), which
implies: (a) s2  s1
2(s1) and (b) g2(s1
2(s1))  g1(s1). Moreover, by monotonicity of
the bid functions we have that fs1 : b
1(s1) 2 [b
2(s2);b)g = fs1 : s1 2 [s2
1(s2);1(b))g
for some 1(b) 2 (s2
1(s2);1]. Note also that if Bidder 2 wins, she gets a good with
value v2(s2;s1) and pays Bidder 1's bid and if Bidder 2 loses she suers a negative












































(g1(s1)   h1(s1)) ds1
where we use that 2 is strictly increasing and (a) in the rst inequality. As for the
second inequality, we use that h2(s1
2(s1))  g2(s1
2(s1)) and (b). To see why h2(s1
2(s1)) 
35Note that ties occur with probability zero and thus the conclusions do not change whether con-
sidering the boundaries of the interval of bids close or open.
53g2(s1
2(s1)), we argue by contradiction. Suppose that h2(s1
2(s1)) > g2(s1
2(s1)), then
Lemma 4 implies that s1
2(s1) < 1 and thus by continuity there exists an interval
[s1
2(s1);a) with a 6= s1
2(s1) such that any s2 in this interval veries that h2(s2) < g2(s2)
and hence that H2(s2) 6= G2(s2). By application of Lemma 3 (d) we have that g2(s2)
is constant in (a;s1
2(s1)], which contradicts the denition of s1
2(s1).






+ [G1(1(b))   H1(1(b))]:
The second dierence is non-positive by Lemma 3 (c). We next argue that the rst one
is equal to zero. If s2
1(s2) is either zero or one, this is because of Lemma 3 (b); otherwise,
it is because G1(s2
1(s2)) < H1(s2
1(s2)) would imply that g1 is constant around s2
1(s2)
by Lemma 3(d), which is a contradiction with the denition of s2
1(s2). 
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